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I. INTRODUCTION
The level of public borrowing plays a central role in UK government
policymaking, especially in the run-up to each Budget. Accurate forecasts of the
overall fiscal stance are crucial in assessing the general health of the economy, the
direction of tax policy and the volume of public services that can be supplied. But
these forecasts have a relatively poor record in the UK in recent years. The
government’s last Financial Statement and Budget Report noted that ‘The budget
deficit is the difference between two large aggregates of spending and receipts and
forecasts of it are inevitably subject to a wide margin of error. Over the past five
years the average absolute errors have been around 1 per cent of GDP, or plus or
minus £8 billion in today’s prices’.
1
A better understanding of how the forecasts are constructed and the
likely sources of error in their component parts is important both for
government decision-making and for appraisal of the policy stance by
outside analysts. The three papers in this symposium
2 demonstrate how
quite different approaches to the problem can be motivated by differing
objectives and access to data. This introductory note gives some
background information on how the public financial position is defined and
what some of the trends have been over the recent past.
                                                                                                                             
*Financial Intermediaries Division, Bank of England.
The opinions expressed in this paper, and any errors, are the sole responsibility of the author.
1HM Treasury, 1997b, paragraph 4.42.
2Held at the Bank of England on 19 February 1998.Fiscal Studies
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II. DEFINING THE PSBR
The main concept considered in UK policymaking is the public sector borrowing
requirement (PSBR) — that is, how much the public sector has to borrow each
financial year to finance the difference between expenditure and its receipts. The
PSBR is largely a cash concept. It can be disaggregated into component borrowing
requirements in different ways. One useful starting-point is a split between the
general government borrowing requirement (GGBR) — the difference between
general government expenditure and receipts on a cash basis — and the very much
smaller amount of market and overseas borrowing by public corporations
(PCMOB). The GGBR is the sum of government borrowing on its own account
and public corporations’ borrowing from central government — which is excluded
from PCMOB.
Alternatively, the PSBR can be split between central government
borrowing on its own account (CGBR(O)) and borrowing by local
authorities and by public corporations.
Table 1 shows what the PSBR was in fiscal year 1996–97 and what the
Treasury forecasts are for 1997–98 and 1998–99. It shows that in 1996–97
the government spent £22.7 billion more than it collected in revenue. Public
corporations’ market and overseas borrowing was very small and so the
PSBR — the amount the public sector needed to borrow overall — was
equal to this difference.
To forecast the PSBR, we need to come up with a prediction of what
both expenditure and receipts will be in the future. The three articles below
present different approaches to doing this and discuss some of the strengths
and weaknesses of these approaches. All the papers find that forecasting
TABLE 1




General government expenditure (GGE) 309.0 319.4 331.3
General government receipts (cash basis) (GGR) 286.3 308.3 327.2
General government borrowing requirement
(GGBR)
22.7 11.1 4.1
Public corporations’ market and overseas borrowing
(PCMOB)
0.1 –0.2 –0.2
PSBR 22.7 10.9 4.0
Central government own account borrowing
(CGBR(O))
24.9 11.2 n/a
Local authorities’ borrowing –0.9 –0.3 n/a
Public corporations’ borrowing –1.3 0.0 n/aThe State of the Public Finances
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receipts and expenditure is prone to significant errors because both
variables depend on a wide range of economic variables and budgetary
choices made by politicians. A small error in forecasting receipts can lead
to a very large error in the forecasted level of the PSBR. For example, an
error of 1 per cent in the forecasted level of total cash receipts in 1996–97
(i.e. an error of £2.9 billion) would have been reflected in a forecast error
of more than 12 per cent in the PSBR (i.e. the forecast for the PSBR would
have been £2.9 billion higher or lower) for a given level of expenditure.
The PSBR is not the only measure of the budget deficit that could be
considered. Alternative concepts include:
· the current balance, which is the difference between current account
expenditure and revenue;
· the public sector financial deficit (PSFD), which is expenditure less revenues
in the National Accounts, consolidating current and capital items; and
· the general government financial deficit (GGFD), excluding public
corporations, which is the most widely internationally comparable measure and
as such has been used for the ‘excessive deficits’ criterion in the Maastricht
Treaty.
Table 2 shows the out-turn for fiscal year 1996–97 and the Treasury forecasts
for 1997–98 and 1998–99 for the current balance and GGFD. Unfortunately, the
TABLE 2








(including depreciation of fixed capital)
306.6 316.4 325.2
Current balance –21.2 –5.5 4.4
Capital spending net of depreciation
(excluding capital transfer receipts,
including capital grants)
8.1 7.5 7.9
General government financial deficit
(GGFD, National Accounts basis)
29.2 13.0 3.5
Adjustment for accruing capital uplift on index-
linked gilts
1.2 –1.8 –1.9
General government financial deficit
(GGFD, Maastricht basis)
30.4 11.2 1.6
Source: HM Treasury, 1997b, Table 4.1.Fiscal Studies
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GGFD figure derived from UK National Accounts is calculated on a slightly
different basis from the Maastricht definition.
3 Both often differ substantially from
the PSBR because they are accruals, not cash, measures and, in particular,
exclude privatisation proceeds.
III. FINANCING THE PSBR
The PSBR, being a cash concept, is arguably more important than other measures
of the budget deficit. It is more transparent than accruals measures,
4 and it also
has operational implications. In March of every year, the government publishes a
Debt Management Report which sets out its financing requirement. It then hands
over a remit to the Bank of England and National Savings.
5 The forecast financing
requirement for the year ahead is derived from the forecast borrowing requirement,
as shown in Table 3. The objective for the Bank of England is ‘full funding’ —
that is, to make gilt sales exactly sufficient to meet the financing requirement net
of National Savings and other public debt issued.
The out-turn for CGBR for fiscal year 1996–97 was £25.1 billion, as
shown in the fourth column of Table 3. A small improvement in the official
reserves plus £12.4 billion in gilt redemptions and the carry-over of £2.2
billion in underfunding from the previous year meant that the financing
requirement was £39.4 billion. Of this, £4.8 billion was funded by National
Savings contributions while net redemption of other public debt added a
further £0.4 billion. This meant that a total of £34.9 billion of financing
needed to come from gilt sales. As the bottom part of the table shows,
£38.7 billion was raised in gilt sales, leaving an overfund of £3.9 billion
which was carried over into the next year (shown in the July 1997
forecast).
Table 3 also demonstrates that the forecasting error does not necessarily
diminish over time. The first column shows the March 1996 remit to the
Bank of England and National Savings. The November forecast was not, in
this case, a better guide than the earlier July one for the out-turn over the
year to 31 March. This led to the overfunding by gilt issue of £3.9 billion,
which, together with a further marked reduction in the forecast borrowing
requirement just four months later, required a corresponding reduction in
the planned supply of gilts in fiscal year 1997–98.
                                                                                                                             
3The only difference is that, like the PSBR cash measure, the Maastricht criterion only requires capital uplift on
index-linked gilts to be counted as expenditure at redemption; the UK National Accounts measure accrues the uplift
annually. Most EU countries are unaffected since they do not issue index-linked government securities.
4Although there has been extensive discussion of the merits of accruals measures of tax receipts, the OECD still
publishes its annual Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries on a cash basis, because of the difficulty of
agreeing what should appropriately be regarded as accrued, uncollected taxes.
5These arrangements will change in future years with the establishment of the Debt Management Agency within the
Treasury.The State of the Public Finances
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TABLE 3





















24.1 28.1 27.9 25.1 20.0 12.4
Expected net change in
official reserves
0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.0 0.0
Expected gilt
redemptions
11.5 11.5 12.5 12.4 19.6 19.6
Underfund out-turn
from previous year
n/k 2.2 2.2 2.2 n/k –3.9
Financing
requirement
35.6 41.8 42.6 39.4 39.5 28.1
National Savings
contribution
3.0 3.0 4.5 4.8 3.0 3.0
Expected sales of other
public debt
0.0 –0.1 –0.3 –0.4 0.0 0.0
Gilt sales required
for full funding
32.6 38.9 38.4 34.9 36.5 25.1




9.2 11.0 11.0 11.2 10.2 7.0
Medium conventionals
(7–15 years)
9.2 11.0 11.0 10.4 8.8 6.0
Long conventionals
(more than 15 years)
9.2 11.0 11.0 11.3 10.2 7.0
Index-linked 4.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 7.3 5.0
Total gilt sales 32.5 38.8 38.8 38.7 36.5 25.0
Sources: HM Treasury, 1997a, Tables 3 and 7; Bank of England, 1996 and 1997.
IV. TARGETING THE PSBR
The UK government generally sets objectives for the PSBR. How these objectives
have been set and how they have been achieved has changed over time. A decade
ago, the government’s Medium-Term Financial Strategy included specific targets
for the PSBR. In the 1987 Financial Statement and Budget Report, a target of 1Fiscal Studies
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per cent of GDP over the medium term was described as ‘the modern equivalent of
a balanced budget’.
When the out-turns deviated from this figure, the policy was to make a
‘fiscal adjustment’ to bring the forecast and the out-turn in line. This was
published as part of the Budget process. But the practice relied on accurate
forecasting and the Chancellor was quoted in March 1987 as having said
that the preceding November’s forecast of the PSBR, of £7.1 billion (1¾
per cent of GDP) was ‘totally ridiculous and up the pole’.
6 Four months
later, the estimate had fallen to only £4.1 billion (1 per cent of GDP). This
highlighted the difficulty of basing policy on PSBR forecasts.
Why were forecasts so wrong in the late 1980s? One possible ‘culprit’
for the dramatic but fortuitous shortfall was mainstream corporation tax in
the wake of the Chancellor’s major 1984 reforms. Corporation tax receipts
in 1986–87 exceeded the 1986 Budget forecast by more than 20 per cent.
In recent years, the principal culprit for error on the receipts side has been
VAT, which had fallen so far short of forecast that a special working group
was set up to report on likely explanations.
7
The only circumstance in which the PSBR could be perfectly targeted
would be if the government could operate a theoretical ‘full feedback’ rule.
Under this system, an overshoot for the year would be corrected by an
immediate increase in taxes attributable to the same year rather than being
financed by additional issue of debt securities, and an undershoot by a
similar decrease. Since the PSBR is a cash measure, to change expenditure
for the preceding year would hardly be feasible since it would involve
clawing back monies already disbursed.
The more general difficulty in targeting the PSBR is judging the position
of the economy over the cycle. A paper issued by the Treasury
8
immediately before the Pre-Budget Report last year illustrated dramatically
what can go wrong if a cyclical improvement in the financial position is
mistaken for a structural change attributable to supply-side reforms.
Figure 1 shows that each Budget Report from 1989 to 1992 failed to
predict the seriousness of rapidly increasing deficits. With the benefit of
hindsight — for most independent forecasters as well as for the Treasury
— it seems clear that the output gap had closed much sooner than
expected (indeed, probably by the end of 1986) and this was a precursor to
a correspondingly dramatic fall in GDP in the early 1990s (Figure 2).
                                                                                                                             
6House of Commons, 1987.
7HM Treasury, 1997c.


















Source: HM Treasury, 1997d, Chart 6. 
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In the new fiscal framework set out in July
9 and November
10 — clearly
foreshadowed in a speech given by the Chancellor just before the election
campaign
11 which noted that he had committed to the policy in 1995 — the
government has adopted two main principles:
· the ‘golden rule’ that, over the cycle, borrowing should be for investment only
and not for current expenditure;
· the level of public debt as a proportion of GDP will be held stable over the
cycle.
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the fiscal projections will be deliberately
prudent and cautious. For example, in the July Financial Statement and Budget
Report, the assumed trend rate of output growth was 2¼ per cent and alternative
fiscal projections were presented in which output was 1½ per cent above trend in
the first half of 1997, compared with the central estimate of a zero output gap.
Cyclically adjusted deficit forecasts were published for both the central and
cautious cases of the output gap. In addition, a Code for Fiscal Stability, founded
on Australian and New Zealand models and mirroring the independence given to
the Bank of England in implementing monetary policy, will commit to
transparency and stability in fiscal policy.
IFS has consistently argued in recent Green Budgets for such principles,
as ‘rules of thumb’ for stable public finances. The first does, however,
require knowledge of net public capital investment, which needs to
incorporate an estimate of total depreciation and other asset revaluations
from historic cost. So, in December, the Treasury issued a further paper
12
setting out first thoughts on how a public sector balance sheet might be
compiled. There are particularly problems with, for example, unfunded
pension liabilities for public sector workers.
In fact, the Maastricht criteria are arguably already as tight as the new
rules, because the annual general government financial deficit is capped at 3
per cent of GDP over the whole of the economic cycle. This has been
graphically described by Governor Trichet of the Banque de France as ‘an
automatically reloading gun’. Governments will generally need to maintain
much lower deficits than 3 per cent over the cycle, or they will not be able
to borrow during a downturn (if you don’t reload your gun, you can’t fire
it again). It follows that reliably accurate forecasts of each government’s
budget deficit or surplus will become of even more pressing importance.
Forecasting can be attempted on a ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ basis.
As Pike and Savage explain in their article below, the Treasury’s approach




12HM Treasury, 1997f.The State of the Public Finances
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is bottom up because its model has two distinct functions. In addition to
forecasting the public finances, the detailed structure of the model reflects
the Treasury’s budgetary role and the need to assess the consequences of
proposed policy changes. Iteration is therefore required, since the
macroeconomic model provides the key input variables for the models
forecasting particular tax and spending components, which once
aggregated have to be checked for consistency against the macro
assumptions.
The model in the article by Sentance, Hall and O’Sullivan is, in contrast,
unipurpose by design. Perhaps surprisingly, it treats the main components
of spending which are conventionally regarded as non-cyclical as
endogenous — in other words, not just social security transfers but also
current spending on goods and services is determined within the model.
Although such spending is directly under official control, the argument is
made that, at the political level, voters demand that public expenditure rises
in line with GDP over time, although this tendency may be checked by
concern about a rising tax burden. A striking consequence of this feature of
the model is that the results of consumer-led growth and of export-led
growth are very different.
The Giles and Hall paper shows that the IFS model fulfils many of the
same criteria as that of the Treasury. In particular, forecasts are made of
revenues from individual taxes. But evidently, like all independent
forecasting teams, IFS does not have access to the raw data that can be
analysed by the government’s two revenue departments. However, there
are some disadvantages as well as benefits to disaggregating in this way:
notably, forecasts of components of GDP are required, the errors in which
may be larger than direct forecasts of GDP in aggregate. The Sentance et
al. approach is less prone to this problem because, although components of
GDP are used in its tax equations, these are much broader aggregates.
Apart from comparing the results of these models against out-turn over
time, as Giles and Hall do so as to judge them against each other, it would
be interesting to compare the performance of government and independent
modellers in some other G7 countries. According to the OECD secretariat,
this appears never to have been done, although the exercise could be
closely related to the copious literature on whether fiscal adjustments are
credible and the effect they have on expectations.
13
Of course, statistics on out-turn of countries’ budget deficits are readily
available and scrutinised with interest, although, as explained above, apart
from the general government financial deficit, strict comparability is rarely
possible. But one principal difficulty in attempting to compare different
                                                                                                                             
13For a good discussion of recent experiences of OECD countries and a review of the literature, see Alesina and
Perotti (1997).Fiscal Studies
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countries’ records in forecasts is that they are made at different times and
intervals. In the UK, official PSBR forecasts are usually made twice yearly,
as required under the Industry Act 1975, although occasionally a third
forecast will be produced (to accompany a Budget immediately following a
general election, for example). But certain taxes and, to a lesser degree,
components of spending are highly ‘lumpy’ across the year; and so, as
illustrated in Table 3 above for 1996–97, it by no means follows that a
forecast for the year made after eight months will be twice as accurate as
one made after only four months.
For as long as countries’ budgetary conventions and practices differ so
markedly, it is not possible to hold a ‘fiscal forecasting Olympiad’; but it
would be very encouraging if the papers presented in this symposium led to
analysis and reporting of the corresponding problems arising for other
countries in this most difficult area of applied economics.
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